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Abstract – Advanced reactors are expected to be based on a concept of operations that is different from what is 
currently used in today’s reactors.  Therefore, regulatory staff may need new tools, developed from the best available 
technical bases, to support licensing evaluations.  The areas in which new review guidance may be needed and the efforts 
underway to address the needs will be discussed.  Our preliminary results focus on some of the technical issues to be 
addressed in three areas for which new guidance may be developed: automation and control, operations under degraded 
conditions, and new human factors engineering methods and tools. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The U.S. nuclear power community is anticipating 
the development of advanced reactors (non-light water 
reactors) envisioned to be ready for deployment in future 
decades.  In addition, the U.S. is participating in 
international efforts related to the licensing of these 
advanced designs. 
  
Many of these advanced reactor designs are expected 
to be based on a concept of operations that is different 
from today’s plants.  For example, operators may be 
expected to concurrently control multiple modules, which 
could be in different operating states, from a common 
control room.  Operators might be required to monitor 
online refueling in one module, while other modules are 
in normal operating states, and another module could be 
facing a transient.  The control rooms are anticipated to be 
fully computer-based.  Procedures are likely to be 
computerized where control actions could be taken 
directly from the procedure display, or semi-automated, 
with the operator authorizing the procedure to take 
actions.  These new concepts of operation will pose new 
and challenging situations for regulatory reviewers as 
well as operators and maintainers.   
 
In a report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), the Brookhaven National Laboratory 
identified human performance issues associated with 
advanced reactors which may have to be addressed in 
future safety reviews (O'Hara, et al. 2004a).  These issues 
were identified by examining current industry 
developments and making projections into the near and 
long-term.  This was done from four perspectives: reactor 
design and technology, instrumentation and control 
technology, human-system integration technology, and 
human factors engineering (HFE) methods and tools. 
 
The issues identified were organized using a concept 
of operations framework.  This framework is appropriate 
for plants in the early stages so that design goals and 
expectations relative to human performance can be 
identified early in the process.  A concept of operations 
covers all facets of personnel interaction with a complex 
system; therefore, it provides a good organizational 
framework with which to cluster and integrate a wide 
variety of issues.  The framework included the following 
dimensions: 
 
• Role of Personnel and Automation 
• Staffing and Training  
• Normal Operations Management 
• Disturbance and Emergency Management  
• Maintenance and Change Management  
 
Two additional dimensions were also included: 
"Plant Design and Construction" and "HFE Methods and 
Tools." Thus the issues were organized into seven 
dimensions in all.   The current plan is to prioritize the 
issues using a Phenomena Identification and Ranking 
Table (PIRT)-like assessment.  Based, in part on that 
PIRT, future research efforts will be planned. 
 
To ensure minimal human error contribution to the 
risk associated with the design, construction, operation, 
testing, and maintenance of these advanced reactor 
facilities, it is anticipated that new review guidance and 
tools, developed from the best available technical bases, 
may be needed  to support licensing and safety 
monitoring tasks.  The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 
Research has initiated the development of technical bases 
for three areas:  automation and control, operations under 
degraded conditions, and new HFE methods and tools. 
This paper summarizes the preliminary results of this 
effort by focusing on some of the technical issues for 
which new guidance may need to be developed. 
   
II. HFE INSIGHTS FOR SELECTED HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
 
II.A. Automation and Control 
 
Research in other arenas, e.g., transportation, 
aerospace, military, has shown that a proper mix of 
human and automatic systems is needed to maximize 
overall human-system efficiency, reliability, and safety 
for the selected models of operations.  In older plants, the 
allocation of functions to human and automatic systems 
was fairly straightforward: they were either automated 
(i.e., controlled automatically) or manually performed by 
plant personnel.  However, as computers have become 
more involved in process control, the nature of 
automation has changed.  This paper focuses on three 
issues: varying levels of automation, automation beyond 
controls, and use of advanced controls. 
 
Varying Levels of Automation 
 
A significant trend in automation is the increased 
integration of human and automatic processes in the same 
control activity.  This results in a varying mix of human 
and automatic actions at different levels of automation.  
An example is shared control where process sequences 
are broken up into discrete chunks and the chunks are 
automated.  However, transition from one chunk to the 
next requires human intervention.  The Advanced Boiling 
Water Reactor plant startup process uses this approach. A 
similar application is when a control sequence is partially 
automated and human intervention is needed to provide 
information not available to the automatic controller.  Yet 
another example is dynamic allocation.  In this case, a 
function can be performed by either automatic systems or 
by humans.  The decision as to who controls the function 
is made dynamically based on situational considerations, 
such as the overall workload of personnel.   
 
The evolution of these approaches is in part an effort 
to minimize the potentially negative effects of automation 
on human performance (such as loss of situation 
awareness and complacency).  However, the use of 
differing levels of automation and human action, as well 
as the methods used to transition between them, may pose 
a concern and, if so, might need to be evaluated in safety 
reviews. 
Automation beyond Controls 
 
Historically “automation” has meant automating a 
control function or process.  Due to recent technological 
developments, computer-based systems offer the 
opportunity to "automate" cognitive activities typically 
performed as part of the decision-making by plant 
personnel and to incorporate "intelligence" in the human-
system interfaces (HSIs).  
 
In this context, the term "agents" is often used to 
refer to who or what is performing an activity; i.e., agents 
are entities that do things.  Figure 1 illustrates the generic 
activities an agent must perform so that functions can be 
achieved.   The agent must monitor the plant to detect 
conditions indicating that a function has to be performed.  
The agent must assess the situation and plan a response. 
Once the response plan is established, it has to be 
implemented by sending control signals to actuators.  The 
agent must also monitor the function to determine that it 
is being successfully accomplished and to replan if it is 
not.  Finally the agent must decide when the function has 
been completed. Human or machine agents can perform 
any of these activities. 
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Figure 1:  Generic activities performed by agents 
 
An "alarm system," for example, is an automated 
monitoring and detection system that alerts operators via 
visual and/or auditory displays when parameters deviate 
from specified limits or setpoints.  However, as more and 
more functionality is given to HSIs, they evolve toward 
automatic systems.  For example, the only difference 
between a typical computer-based procedure and an 
automatic process system is the response implementation.  
Computer-based procedures (CBPs) can monitor, assess, 
and plan a response (essentially a paper procedure is a 
response plan strategy).  With most CBPs the operator 
decides if the action is correct and implements it.  If a 
CBP is also given the means to initiate controls, it 
becomes an automatic system.  Essentially, computerized 
support systems and intelligent HSIs are semiautomatic 
systems where human and machine agents are responsible 
for different generic activities. 
 
The extension of automation beyond simple control 
functions and the cooperative integration of human and 
machine resources may need to be addressed in safety 
reviews. 
 
Use of Advanced Controls 
 
Digital control systems provide the capability to 
implement much more advanced control algorithms than 
have been used in plants to date.  Current plants rely 
primarily on single-input, single-output classical control 
schemes to automate individual control loops. Some 
multi-variable control schemes have been applied and 
some plants incorporate a modest level of integration of 
control loops.  However, more advanced control methods 
and algorithms have not been applied in nuclear plants, 
although many have been studied in research programs 
and some have been applied in other industries.  It seems 
likely that advanced reactors will take advantage of more 
advanced control in order to help meet objectives of 
increased operability, multi-unit or multi-module control, 
and reduced staffing. 
 
Advanced control schemes include matrix techniques 
for optimal control, nonlinear control methods, fuzzy 
logic, neural networks, adaptive control (a control that 
modifies its behavior based on plant dynamics), expert 
systems, state-based control schemes, and schemes that 
combine multiple control methods in a multi-mode or 
hierarchical system to achieve optimum performance (see 
Wood et al., 2003 for a survey of these methods).  
Application of these advanced techniques will lead to 
more integrated control of plant systems and processes 
(versus separate, non-interacting control loops) and 
greater complexity.  
 
This presents a number of potential issues related to 
human performance.  First, increased control complexity 
affects design, operations, maintenance, and engineering 
support personnel.  The design and verification and 
validation of the control schemes will be considerably 
more difficult to implement than classical control 
schemes.  Once designed and implemented, operations 
personnel will need sufficient understanding of the 
control schemes to be able to monitor their performance, 
determine whether they are working correctly, and be 
prepared to back them up.  Maintenance and engineering 
support personnel will likewise be affected by the 
additional complexity and interactivity of the control 
schemes. 
 
A second issue is related to implementation of 
intelligent control approaches that learn or change over 
time.  Use of adaptive control methods and techniques, 
such as on-line knowledge capture and machine learning, 
offer the advantage that the performance of controls can 
be improved over time as the plant is operated.  However, 
this also means that the behavior of the controls will be 
changing.  Operation and maintenance personnel will 
need to be cognizant of these changes and monitor the 
effects of the changes on plant performance. 
 
Finally, more integrated control schemes can result in 
greater difficulty for operators when failures occur.  This 
has already been seen in some operating plants that use 
integrated control systems in which multiple control loops 
interact when the system is in a fully automatic mode 
(e.g., the original Babcock & Wilcox Integrated Control 
System).  Failures have the potential to cause multiple 
control loops to malfunction, placing the operators in a 
situation in which they must manually control multiple 
systems.  Also, advanced control schemes may have 
multiple modes of operation and may switch 
automatically when plant conditions change or failures 
occur.  The operators must maintain an awareness of the 
current mode of automation, be able to interact effectively 
with the system during all expected modes, and be 
prepared to back up the system if required. 
 
A significant safety consideration is how personnel 
will react to failures of instrumentation and control (I&C) 
systems when more complex, advanced control schemes, 
integrated control, multi-mode control, and adaptive 
control methods are applied.  It will be important for plant 
operators, maintenance personnel, and engineers to be 
able to distinguish between and react appropriately to:  
process anomalies, sensor anomalies or failures, control 
adjustments or adaptations made automatically by the 
system, and control system failures 
 
II.B. Operations under Degraded Conditions 
 
Advanced reactors are expected to rely heavily on 
integrated digital I&C equipment for Reactor Protection 
Systems and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation 
System.  The I&C systems of a nuclear power plant have 
three major roles. First, they are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the 
operator. If properly planned, designed, constructed and 
maintained, they will provide accurate and appropriate 
information and permit judicious action during both 
normal and abnormal operation. They are, therefore, with 
the human operator, vital to the safe and efficient 
operation of the plant. Second, under normal operating 
conditions they provide automatic control, both of the 
main plant and of many ancillary systems. This allows the 
operator time to observe plant behavior and monitor what 
is happening so that the right corrective action can be 
taken quickly, if required. Third, under abnormal 
conditions, they provide rapid automatic action to protect 
both the plant and the environment. 
 
Even though digital systems are typically highly 
reliable, their potential failure or degradation could 
significantly impact plant response and plant safety. 
While digital technology has the capability to improve 
operational performance, there are challenges to the 
introduction of this technology into nuclear power plants. 
These challenges include:  (1) rapid changes in digital 
technology could impact digital system design, testing 
and application; (2) the increased complexity of digital 
technology, compared to its analog counterpart, could 
potentially require enhanced licensing reviews, 
complicate configuration control, and require detailed 
documentation; and (3) the impact of unique failure 
modes and degradations associated with digital 
technology on plant response, including the required 
operator actions, may be challenging. 
 
Thus it is important to identify the degradation and 
failure modes of digital I&C systems during abnormal and 
accident conditions that could impact on operations and 
crew monitoring and control functions.  
 
I&C degradation may be caused by a variety of 
events, such as instrument failure, computer failures, 
seismic events, fire and smoke damage, internal flooding, 
and loss of electrical power.  These events may cause a 
range of failures from individual control room 
instruments to more significant degradations, such as the 
loss of all displays. Issues associated with this topic 
include: 
 
• Detection of Digital System Failure - The loss of 
hardwired displays and controls is readily apparent to 
plant personnel.  However, the degradation modes and 
failures in digital systems can be more difficult to detect, 
especially in the case of degradations short of complete 
failure.  The reason for this is that much of the 
information with which the crew interacts will be at a 
high level as compared to the single sensor-single display 
relationship that characterizes more traditional equipment.  
Information displays, for example, will often represent the 
integration of many lower level data points.  The impact 
of sensor and processing degradation on these higher-
level displays is not well understood. In addition, such 
features as improved system diagnostics and signal 
validation will have an effect on the operator's ability to 
monitor, detect, and control system failures. 
 
• Transition to Back-up Systems - Upon failures of 
digital systems, crews may have to transition to use of the 
hardwired controls and displays and paper procedures 
where available.  Crew interactions with these 
technologies are very different from their interaction 
when using digital systems.  Digital systems provide a 
great deal of support to crews in terms of information 
access and suitability to ongoing task requirements that is 
not available from conventional, analog-based 
technology. The crews can become dependent on this 
support, so crews will need multiple competencies to 
respond to these incidents.   
 
• Teamwork - Prior NRC-sponsored research has 
shown that digital systems have a significant impact on 
crew teamwork and coordination (Roth & O'Hara, 2002).  
This was an unanticipated consequence in many of the 
first plant modernization programs that occurred in 
foreign plants.  For example, the availability of improved 
monitoring, decision support, controls, and automation, 
frequently alters the crew's role more toward system 
supervisors.  This is because the digital systems perform 
many of the lower level activities associated with data 
gathering and processing.  Thus, the crews are freed from 
these lower level activities.  This has often resulted in a 
shift to less teamwork, less communication, and more 
difficultly for crew members to monitor each other's 
activities.  With respect to the latter, when crew members 
are located at individual panels, it is relatively easy to see 
what they are doing.  By contrast, when crew members 
are seated in front of computer monitors, it is much more 
difficult to be aware of what they are doing.  When the 
digital systems are lost, the crew must shift its activities to 
once again accomplish the lower-level responsibilities 
that the digital system performed.  In this case, the type of 
teamwork needed is more similar to present day control 
rooms.  
 
All of these issues may become more significant as 
new generations of operators, trained mainly on digital 
system operations, have to cope with abnormal situations.  
Current crews are already well trained in the use of 
conventional equipment and in the teamwork 
requirements associated with its use.  Succeeding 
generations of operators will become less and less 
familiar with the conventional equipment.  New 
approaches to the review of operations under degraded 
conditions may be needed to ensure effective and safe 
management of these situations. 
 
II.C. New HFE Methods and Tools 
 
HFE methods are used to analyze, design, test and 
evaluate the HFE aspects of a plant, such as the HSI.  The 
methods are important because NRC HFE reviews are 
design process oriented (NUREG-0711, 2004), thus, the 
criteria are mostly technology neutral with regard to 
reactor design. However, the HFE review criteria are not 
neutral with respect to the HFE methods that are used as 
part of the design process.  This will be important for 
advanced reactor reviews because the diversity of reactor 
types, HSIs, and operational concepts will increase, 
especially for advanced reactors.  
 
Trends and issues in emerging HFE methods were 
identified in the nuclear industry, related industries, and 
the military arena through a review of the literature and 
discussions with subject matter experts.  Well over 100 
new methods and tools were identified.  The methods 
were then organized into the following categories: 
Analysis, Design, and Test and Evaluation. 
 
Analysis methods are used to develop detailed, 
system-specific information and requirements for inputs 
to HFE design activities.  While there is general 
agreement on the importance of beginning HFE activities 
early in the design process, there is a need for more 
formal and structured approaches.  Areas where guidance 
is needed include: operating experience analysis and the 
development of lessons learned, function allocation, 
human reliability analysis (HRA), and the development 
and application of knowledge engineering techniques.   
Two examples are given below. 
 
Because they primarily focus on conventional manual 
actions, current HRA methods may not be well suited to 
advanced designs which incorporate increased 
automation, alternative concepts of operations, and 
intelligent agents.  HRA will be further constrained by the 
lack of data to support human error probability estimates.  
Information to address this gap may be needed.  
 
On the other hand, one area that has been evolving 
rapidly is task analysis.  Recent advances in work 
analysis, cognitive task analysis, and cognitive 
engineering are especially applicable to supervisory 
control tasks.  However, there is a lack of information on 
the appropriate application and selection of such methods.  
The review of appropriate analysis methods may need to 
be improved. 
 
Design methods translate requirements into detailed 
designs.  Advanced methods are evolving to develop 
designs in far less time and with more user input. Using 
techniques such as rapid prototyping, designs quickly 
evolve through a number of iterations with users to obtain 
feedback and make HSI modifications.  The cycle is 
repeated until the design is completed.  A potential 
concern relates to the technical basis on which these HSIs 
are developed, since the design may be based on a limited 
sample of users and may not incorporate tested and 
validated design features.  Without information on the use 
of such techniques the resulting design may not be 
technically sound. 
 
Future HSIs are also likely to provide information at 
much higher levels than exist in today’s plants, such that 
base data are integrated or aggregated and the operator 
may not have access to the base data.  Lower-level 
information will be integrated and processed to provide 
more meaningful information to operators regarding plant 
status.  While this type of information display may be a 
promising advance, there are no well-defined processes 
for conducting the analyses needed to specify them or to 
review the process at the design stage.  
A key issue regarding test and evaluation methods is 
how the effects of advanced and intelligent systems can 
be evaluated.  Evaluations are becoming more 
performance-based, thus performance measurement and 
criteria are important considerations.  Measures that 
reflect integrated system performance may be necessary 
for which criteria for system acceptability can be 
established.  Further, since personnel work as teams, 
modeling and measurement of effective team performance 
is an important consideration. 
  
In a performance-based approach, validation of 
integrated systems is a key activity and many aspects of 
its methodology are being impacted by technology. For 
example, one significant component is the testbed, such as 
a full-mission simulator.  New technologies are being 
developed that provide alternatives to traditional testbeds, 
e.g., virtual reality (VR).  An important question that 
should be addressed is the validation of VR models and 
the understanding of how the methodology is applied.  In 
general, clearly defined and accepted methodological 
criteria are needed to review licensee submittals which are 
based on the use of VR techniques.  
  
While the above issues relate to measuring actual 
personnel performance, current trends are to obtain 
“performance data” from human performance models, 
such as task network models and discrete event 
simulation.  Since operator availability is limited and the 
means to collect data can be resource intensive, models 
are an attractive alternative to extensive man in the loop 
simulator testing.  As modeling improves, its application 
will be extended to more complex design and evaluation 
situations.  Both the validity of the modeling and its 
results needs to be considered in a licensing process. 
 
When looking across the new methods and tools, 
several major trends were identified. 
 • Computer-based aids are being used for performing 
traditional analyses, such as link analysis. 
 • Rapid development tools/approaches, such as rapid 
prototyping, can be used to develop interfaces more 
rapidly, at less cost, through the use of iterative methods, 
incorporating user input and feedback 
 • Computer-based design tools (e.g. rapid 
prototyping), that are not tied to design guidelines, are 
used in iterative design processes. 
 • HFE methods are being integrated to address 
multiple aspects of the design process. 
 • Intelligent advisors are being used in computer-
aided design.  
 • Human performance models are being used as a 
supplement to or replacement for data collection based on 
actual users). 
 • Techniques such as virtual reality are being used to 
support design and evaluation as a supplement to or 
replacement of physical mockups and simulators. 
 • There is more focus on methods that address 
human cognition, such as cognitive task analysis and 
knowledge engineering.  
 • Design is being extended into operations using 
flexible and modifiable HSIs to provide users with tools 
that allow them to change HSIs to suit their needs. 
 
HFE methods are rapidly evolving and generating 
new approaches to designing the HFE aspects of plants.  
Thus, improvements to the methods and criteria used for 
reviews may be needed to keep pace with the advances in 
analysis, design, test and evaluation methodologies. 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Advanced plants will offer the potential for 
improvements in performance and safety.  However, there 
are still challenges ahead, especially as personnel and 
technology are integrated into final designs.  While these 
advances may pose challenges for vendors and licensees, 
they will potentially present challenges to reviewers as 
well.  Research to develop the technical basis from which 
regulatory review guidance could be developed to meet 
these challenges has been initiated.  The intent of these 
efforts is to set clear expectations for how advanced 
designs could be evaluated, to reduce regulatory 
uncertainty, and to provide a well-defined path to 
licensing of advanced reactors. 
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